

Composite of intelligence reading analysts on Cuba was build-up  
was unique in previous intelligence operations.

But some were understandably cautious in raising any  
alarm over the possibility of MRBMs in Cuba.

[Community did not "ignore strong, direct evidence"  
on missiles. Direct evidence was weak; impact  
of it was appropriate.]

Problem was a) prior probes, presumptions  
and because of them, b) was build up, speed, scale,  
progress was not treated as  
"indirect evidence."

[These things were least likely given. SO intent  
not to put in MRBMs as given intent to put in  
missiles. Hence, "Almost no evidence"  
on the 29,

(Excerpt to Holmes & He found SO never "suggested"  
— puzzling — i.e. unpredictable, unpredictable, unless  
[Some meant to put in MRBMs])]

?  
A mistake: lack of direct evidence taken as very strong  
evidence. But a little more not appear soon.

22  
L. 30 days ending Aug; only 7 reports on "missiles" (Colate).  
Next 30 days, none then 40; and about 40 between 20 Sept  
and 14 Oct, including a few on large missiles.

In latter period, 6 reports relating to IL-28's, 4 on May 21's.

(checked?)  
In mid-Sept, no evidence of Sov's intentions and no  
evidence that strat. missiles had already arrived

15 Sept. letter from source: Political zone in Pinar del Rio  
guarded by Sovs as of 7 Sept; access to zones controlled;  
internal concerned with missiles. Disseminated 18 Sept.

Agent: Castro's pilot arrived on 7 Sept; reports for RBMs.

Dissemin. 20 Sept

Agent: Chief of war plans; have atomic weapons. 21 Sept.

Refugees: conveying 12 Sept, interviewed 21 Sept

Refugees: to look conveying Port Secchia on 2 Sept 23 Sept

" to be conveyed 1 Oct

Agents: unloaded at Mariel, 17 Sept; unloaded 1 Oct; 2 Oct

(Comments: Not likely that source discovered

It-2 missiles being unloaded)

Refugees: returned at Mariel 2 Oct

More later, but there enough for strong suspicion



April - Sept. over 1000 reports from CIA-Longitudinal sources

April - Oct. 5700 51 items

4700 reports from refugees, Opa-Sales.

Reports in third week of August indicated to community that  
scale and magnitude of influx of Cub personnel &  
equipment into a non-Cuba country was unprecedented in  
its military and activities.

When refugee reports were so severely biased that all  
with refugee reporting seemed to be regarded with strong  
suspicion. — Subjects, very, very, apparently they could be  
influenced by the Cuban Government.

[perception of bias → reports of "persecutions" by  
Cuba had low residential weight.]

[Though still, could influence recon activities,  
help form hypotheses; focus attention —  
all these activities being very sensitive to info,  
requiring little "weight" accepting very  
high false alarm rate. "Work, private".

Threshold for this allegedly lower than for i.1 probably, i.1 being leaders

3. i.1 being "subliminal" to Opa, i.1 being of i.1 being Congress of "endure"

7. Decisions on air attacks; centers rehearsed? Why put on Saturday? (to show cover story?) Why land in Miami?

8. Decision on ~~air cover~~ air strike. Effect of "imposing."

9. Effect of K letter.

10. What happened on air cover; decision, operation.

Thompson? 50 threats? Apparent success of air attack on Saturday?

## Questions on Bay of Pigs: Johnson

1. Was there a chance landing would take place before election?
2. Was there a participant in the field — as plans changed to a landing?
3. Why was small number considered adequate for landing?
4. Role in JFK's mind of his campaign pledges?
5. Fear of loss reputation; of comparison to Kennedy, Bay?
6. What advisors US involvement could be secret, minimum?
7. Why did JFK rule out US intervention, & press conference? How much did this influence him later?
8. Plan for US help after gov. established on mainland? How big, how soon?
9. Role of Stevenson; did he know? Did he influence Piers? Was his earlier influence important?

1961

See for is statement by State: <sup>reports</sup> doubts that Castro would let  
SU establish missile bases.



1955

Aug 23, 1955: agree with Eden, Pres 1 impression from  
standpoint of time, for Kerguelen (Kerguelen 1. Do  
nothing till can judge temper of E. Min. meeting - then decide  
whether desirable to proceed. [after Eden and]

Dec 1, 1955: Pres informed to let Kerguelen proceed,  
pending Eden response.

May 17, 1956: Agreements forthcoming for this being:  
Mauritius relevant under existing circumstances.  
[after Belgium - & visits?] [UK flights?]

The weather change in low altitudes is more than superficial!

Sept 1, 1956: UK aerial explorations from Canton Island.

OK

5. Who/why/when decision not to "get Castro" or even  
down him, etc.?

6. Did E. S. discuss, predict, how many missiles  
would turn up in Cuba, then or later, and effects of  
this?

7. Did we stress possibility that Cubans might gain control:  
inter threats, etc.?

(Cuba, we stressed too many controls. Why?)

and private statements placed no restriction on  
type or purpose of low weapons in Cuba.

If weapons were put under Cuban control,  
this would reduce likelihood of US attack on Cuba; but  
they weren't.

Why do rockets in Cuba "enhance" Cuba's  
defensive capability? more than missiles in S.S.?

"Military equipment Cuba needs for its own defense."  
but w/ S.S. manning & control of low rockets already in S.S.

4. "How could Cuba be a threat to US?"

Consider relative size & resources, of this country.

But what assumptions were being given  
of scale of deployment in Cuba? US could have  
easily & quickly put more SACMs in Cuba than  
US had SACMs in Europe. What then of  
"little Cuba"?



## Questions on Cuba:

1) What led to emphasizing danger of nuclear war?  
(not emphasizing non-nuclear acts by US) - why the  
"What was best for Cuba" Any discussion?  
Why, "full retaliatory response"?

2) Why did SU maintain deception after Oct 22?

Were they taken completely unprepared by US disclosure  
no plans to respond? How did they mean to  
announce after Nov 6? Why no use of these  
plans? (See statement by Pres. of UN - given? -  
Oct 23). (See Nov. of Oct 73)

3. On deception: if SU had no need to put rockets  
in Cuba, given economy, etc. of missiles in SU, and if  
rockets in SU were available for retaliation, why did they  
put them in Cuba "for offensive purposes"? If all  
weapons in SU are "offensive" then how statement of 1st of

Effects of secrecy: Effort to keep activities X secret  
in one's own country (in part, to keep opponent from  
focusing on them) may keep one from focussing  
attention on activities X by opponent.

## Directions

17 Feb 80 CWR

K's attempts to reestablish her position on long standing East-West issues will be formulated with an eye to preparing the ground for a new cycle of negotiations which Moscow anticipates following the US elections.

17 Feb 80 SS The cables & press have made similar statements that no action will be taken on the U-2 issue till after the US elections, suggesting the two are consulting closely on the problem.



Protect gap in coverage covered info on Soviet intentions  
and Cuban compliance therewith. No reporting sources in  
the SO provided a specific hint as to her intentions, and  
no sources close to Cuban leadership furnished anything  
specific on their decisions and actions w.r.t. her build-up.

DDI, I&R, DDIA, ONCA, DDCI

Intelligence meeting group

Inspector General: Dir, Const Staff of I&R;

Chief, CH-500; CH-500 Dist Dir for Internal Reference;

Exec Off Jack Brown W, CH.

[What if there had not been the intelligence buildup  
in Cuba? What if level of intell. attention to Cuba  
had been much less? How much difference had  
buildup make?

Action started between Jan - March '62; To understand  
intensification March 14, '62 after receiving preliminary findings  
of W/5 85-62, by Propaganda. Anticipated increase  
in action by end of July.

W/5 - CH-500 Intelligence House included action on message.

Still desire for recognition of quality from US, resistance  
to admission of inequality;

there for latitude of relationship; but unwillingness to  
compromise.

Desire for more of class of acceptance, precluding  
genuine, lasting accommodation (no, expectation

that what will break agreement, 'eventually'?

→ high level of aspiration → unwillingness to

double-cross) Tendency by the US of gradual

optimism.

I think there is that both sides to regard each

other as necessary to each other, personally



N/E 11-9-62 Gordon Low Foreign Policy 21 May 62

Low which, on a matter of general policy, to answer  
with a political risk of rising the over force to  
reduce local forces. Even in non-prohibited areas  
(and warnings made by pro-Low forces in some cases)  
the challenge to Western interests is not great enough  
and their own involvement is not great enough to  
involve risk of a direct encounter between US & Low forces.

1. The point which Low did mention is that the  
US was too strong, or at least that they would not be  
in contempt of US 1 or to regard them as <sup>low</sup> ~~low~~

His reference to "national liberation" was often interpreted as  
meaning Chinese criticism that US & USSR were only not  
altogether the same force.

The evidence of my fundamental opposition to policy is  
the right of a somewhat illuminating record of events.

(*Prion. persiana*) will not, in any case, cause the  
lives to run significantly greater risk than last-visit  
reservations than they are now willing to contemplate.

(Does Ambassador believe in Castro's identification of Cuba with Jose B. - Masses will avoid assuming explicit military obligation to defend security of regime, e.g. by making members of Masses Part. Does official Cuban press continue attack and identify with Jose B. will Masses appear if Cuban case and will prospects for expanding Cuban movement & Jose influence in the continent.)

(Expected presence on Orlando, but some cutting short  
of <sup>in Calo</sup> ORANGE would pay off there, little sampling seen?)



see Bill of Rights from 1948 in Berlin

included in first draft of ENVE

ENVE objected on basis of intelligence of Deft talks on  
not moving from the situation; the Deft 1 paper, statement can be taken  
+ from reports

3. Aug: (Bill of Rights?) - See Treaties in Berlin - last one

was that the chances are better than ever that.

27. Aug. more progress little hope in further negotiations and  
have decided to move forward militarily, accomplishing  
purpose of the various objectives of a peace treaty, at  
it some point in the process, signing it.

(Korean War - Korea talks late July; never came to demand,  
no NATO talks in progress; threat of separate treaty  
in short time (President) would be, abolishing the 200,000  
officers in Berlin, moved by C. L. K. K. K.

ENVE requested on basis of the news  
for 2 Sept.



"negotiation" on 11-15-67

11-15 (Sun) Thursday: Interim draft 8 p.m. 7

(only 2 of 10-10-67, 8 p.m. 6)

at least  
judgment - preliminary and cannot be supported by the  
evidence

believe, the policy is in a phase of stalled up  
pressure in movement to bring about reconciliation negotiations.  
... believe they have stalled on topic of their further involvement in the  
... further believe that there is still not serious  
of signing a peace treaty until they have either been able  
to implement its basic provisions in advance or have  
what they consider adequate assurances from U.S. that  
such provisions can be implemented with no problems.  
(acceptable)

Draft 8:15 11-15-67 10 p.m. reflects 11-15 meeting

"believe" it was put signing it

... pressure in movement to bring about reconciliation negotiations,  
prediction of signing dispute with

The Left public has stated, "imagine" BR  
was "Reassuring": "elections" seem first an internal  
affair for one more postponement.

Left: Council has taken in Berlin

Dr. Bauer declared a "peace" is sought over Berlin...  
it was the 12th hour, which ended with a separate  
treaty. The next few months will indicate the evidence  
on eventual completion of negotiations. Harassment  
likely that it will continue to make serious violation of  
rules in order to accomplish disarmament & de facto some  
of the changes which would flow from a peace treaty.

(Discussion of dangers about with 12 hour 12 Sept!)

Left statement of 11 Sept appears to make out a  
separate treaty in the next few months. It is possible  
that some approval of the situation at this time, perhaps  
convinced with the increase of tension over Cuba, has led  
the Jews to conclude one sign that a separate treaty  
which poses a threat challenge to the Western power is not  
absent. Berlin is too hazardous a course.



(So SAIS process starts on news publicity treaty;  
doesn't conclude that this is unilateral, but makes  
concession to CIA since in discussion said "it was their paper";  
the Sept 1 statement however leaves change in conclusion  
(and really confirms NR in belief in general cooling-off) but  
without saying discussion.

Why should Pass take the seriously? Why not  
express different views, not consensus?

NR people convinced to CIA that "they had the  
basic window", in other hand, (Don't think) OVE  
thought NR had some window they didn't have; + they <sup>ONE</sup>  
might not have the info in private com that  
NR had. Neither had even Gals-Ron memo.

(Why not redo window estimates after Sept 11?)

Instead of saying information (?) the thing is - 12 Sept  
reference to 11 Sept statement.



Then, 15 Sept, Ives signed agreement with  
him that Ives would not station missiles on its  
soil — after ~~two~~ month of refusing to sign this,  
pending for more extensive, ~~con-agg~~ pact.

Looked to Ives like further request: "We won't  
station missiles near you, if you don't near us."

STN 15  
Meanwhile, 25-3-62 2nd Advanced 1.5 inch system in Cuba  
requested 10 Sept.

And, The Military Building in Cuba, 14 Sept 62.

Purposes to defend Cuba against this against what  
the Cubans and have concluded to be a real danger that  
it may attempt to overthrow (regime). Ives evidently

Changes from 14 Sept draft: in 17 Sept draft

Note: the USSR has granted more credits to other states, but not with such speed & flexibility, and at much more cost to itself.

Note: The (1 Sept) estimate as a whole is probably a substitute for the guarantee which the Centre requires almost certainly has been made.

[Signal - info - depends on personal alternatives]

(I am now making of providing the USSR and allowing Centre to provide the USSR by going to her and the front with no military blockade.

Note: not note that 1 Sept statement for first time established links between 'Berlin & Cuban crises' and implied that US action in Cuba would be contained by  
Does-see?  
Does-see?  
Does-see?



(Pearl Harbor)

1. The Japs themselves are probably still uncertain about  
their future course in Cuba. Indeed, they are engaging  
[future military program]

in a state of uncertainty, carefully watching  
US & CH reactions as they go. [probably intend to test  
go & CH reactions as they proceed.] At the same time they  
are obliged to take their policy to minimize risk of  
cooperation with the US

While it is our judgment that, even in the light of  
recent developments, our policy remains fundamentally  
unaltered, we cannot exclude the possibility that  
Morrow is at least considering a change in the policy



Consequently they seem to realize that to provide within  
the types of workers to Cuba would pose a ~~challenge~~  
to strong and clear challenges to the US

[Chavez poses a challenge to which the US might  
possibly respond.]

On the whole we believe the laws would not calculate  
that the TL-250 could be supplied to Cuba in  
more than very small numbers without serious risk  
of US intervention.

[Chavez the ... does not calculate that a modest  
number of TL-250s could be supplied to Cuba without  
serious risk of US intervention.]

(Chavez depicting risk of US reaction as slight from  
lack of confidence in it.)

The establishment of Cuban rail of our striking forces  
which could be used against the US would be  
incompatible with low price <sup>presently</sup> ~~as we~~ estimate it. X  
It would indicate a less <sup>greater</sup> willingness to risk  
what than the US has <sup>disregard</sup> before, in  
1962

While the US might think that the political effect of  
delaying the US by <sup>destroying</sup> ~~some~~ striking power in so  
narrowing a position would be <sup>with a good deal</sup>  
I <sup>would</sup> if they could not <sup>would it?</sup> they would  
almost certainly not estimate that this could be done  
without provoking a dangerous US reaction. X



If the military advantages of a low attempt to reach  
also as a strategic strike were marginal  
a balance with the risks great

[change to: Although there may be some military  
advantages in the risk would be great...]

The political implication was extremely adverse.  
[They would see us] to the kind of policy the  
Soviet is actually pursuing in C.A.

Detail: The intrusion of low military power into the  
Soviet sphere was only for a hindrance to that power.

[Political up for change to address, perhaps because  
concerns that action was being allowed  
to "win" rather than "lose" because of "Soviet Tradition"  
at least till after election. As thought to actual losses  
forthrightly has to improvement in his position expected  
after election — which I am not sure that would be  
prevented by risk of conflict with US.]



beliefs for or LA reaction to kind of mind here:

It is unlikely that the DCS as a whole could be  
brought together on any kind of unit action. It is  
almost certain that the DCS would be split between  
nationalists advocating a nationalist position & those supporting  
intervention.

18 Sept: RSE draft Conclusion.

(Minister's view) would be incompatible with the practice  
to date and not the policy as we presently estimate it.

✓

From: 1) Possibly K thought that by Oct 13 JFK  
already knew at least of preparations for NQVW,  
maybe 10-15, but decided to ignore.

2) JFK on morning of 22 Oct (like Thompson, RFK) - if  
we were on this one, claim for great breakthrough  
to improved relations.

3) High-stopping needs by Rusk on evening of 26 Oct,  
emergency to that we were getting out of its intimidation,  
concession on Turkey; resignation to deal on 27 Oct,  
if we look to...

Reyes at Richmond - but why? For speaking 26 Oct,  
& stall? For encouraging to act, for Turkey? For  
making it necessary for us to repudiate, harder to accept -  
instead of leaving us free to alter, if necessary?

encourage

✓



4. Private channel — encourages personal involvement,  
"a relationship," feeling of personal commitment in  
discussions, understandings

[tendency to personalise low gear — as "K, he"  
"he couldn't mean," "you can't do that to him"]

Thompson emotionally involved with K

5. K then to broader conversation in sociological, cultural  
terms — some that he is to lead him to feel self-disgust  
later, but he has exposed himself (many about what?)  
revealed himself, admitted intimate private times  
including many references to Allen (to Mellette, seeing  
Adrianne marked; from the back, "Gerrard, divided,"  
from the front, "Gerrard shall not see again.")

second class

6. Pissara's "intimacy," Stamen badly worried in talk with  
K in Moscow. (What?) also "intimacy" Adabovsky felt

WFF didn't show up well in talking (not first day?)

Pissara would the second night be released in 1960 campaign?  
Fullbright hinted. (Melley? Garrison?)

V



## Personal Diplomacy

1. Did K suffer, from being in relations with SEC because of Cuba? eg credit? approval? willingness to compromise?

2. Letters from SEC were trusted for him. Letters from K?

3. What was content was there in private channel? How different from public? (Brown: these letters were meant for eventual publication).

How did K inspire confidence, through Secord? Did he express himself & contrary colleagues often; report own mistakes; avoid past mistakes, ready for criticism, aware for increasing international problem?

Did he really respond to SEC's questions in Havana?

Did tone ever change from Havana?

(Was all he did, to say "I am coming to touch you?" )

✓

## Merrill, Kap & Ciba

1. Three different inter. 'philosophies' abundant:

- a) 1957-61. OSSE (1966): SO tension, opponent, hostile,  
lots OS - orientation toward the principal opponents;  
centralized; strict handling strategy; (to control lib.?)  
(to control bluff, wouldn't risk confrontation over  
border of L. didn't have the cards, wouldn't gamble  
on opponents' moves; wouldn't rely on efforts of  
foreigners in allies.

b) C. & State SO caution, wary of direct confrontation,

[Does tell even analysis clearly the nature of  
limits of evidence. What to be used by P. & S. &  
washed statements.

✓



10/29/55

8 Aug

DCI: Forward arrival of 2000,  
national question of defense  
which includes several of men &  
entirely, said US can't face  
the possibility of USSR  
Khrushchev's MREMs in Cuba

no a step it could justify

Review of US missile bases in

Italy - Turkey (to G)  
(Prior to MRC of 34th)

[Did SU, R were refused  
directly to JFK statement of  
4, 10 3-ft 2 w.c.t. MREMs?  
(27 2-ft R-JFK)

DCI

21 Aug: also include mine

10 Aug: showed how and question  
than thought previously, prob included  
some.

8 Aug: DCI briefing to R. Sub. Policy Com

10 Aug: DCI, MREMs - Italy (MREMs)

10 July: Taylor report for review of exam

16 July: DCI/101 memo

17 July: SS forward of 2/10 (to R. Sub.)  
revised

8 Aug: 2d Aug diff. with;  
again scheduled for period  
beginning 19 Aug: 19 Aug: 19 Aug

21 Aug: R. Sub. R. McN,  
J, R. Sub., Taylor, R. McN, M. G.,  
N.C.

DCI: 34th probable MREMs  
(currently?)  
possible; because of US actions  
of MREMs

27 Aug: DCI brief Base in this

27 Aug: R. McN, R. Sub., M. G. &

DCI discuss with Base on 27 Aug

V



18 Aug. Checklist should be same.

28 Aug meeting: agreed criteria & problem for OS actions

agreed: VSA 181.

a) action of ships (?)

a) M240000

c) first set. ... of same as 30th (Heavy Bomb, 27 Aug)

... by M26 (last) in Sept. of 31 Aug,

including result (?) of 27 Aug mission.

29 Aug 061 started ... 8:45 by ... to ... 26 Aug

27 Aug: ... began ... highlights to ... 26 Aug.

Till 19 Sept.

29 Aug: ... to ... 181, ... 27 Aug on

mid. buildup.

7 Sept. <sup>both</sup> attempt to ... it ... TILL ...

from 27 Aug, 5 Sept could be ...



27 Aug USIB meeting: Carter, ... That ...

27 Aug, ... planned from ... of town; ...

Very delay of 22 Aug ... by weather, ... to

... from ... low-level photos

DCI: left Wash 22 Aug to West Coast, left US

on 30 Aug for ... returned 23 Sept

SG 30 Aug. (told of 20 Aug photos?)

Pres told ... (checklist, 31 Aug.)

Am 4+5 Sept, Carter ... from ...

By about 6 Sept [ ... ; ... 7 Sept]

Be more detailed ... 29 Aug flight ...

to report ... another ...

1949 - at ... <sup>Chie</sup> ...

(left ... but ... in USIA)

(Pres - told info)





Further info is study needed to find source, range.

7 Sept: COMSEC, at request of R, reviewed articles available  
for view of Comsec.

10 Sept: Center to MoA,

14 Sept: US brief 86 on report for Comsec and view of Comsec,  
MoA requested consideration postponed till receipt of further  
U-2 coverage, on schedule.

14 Sept: CIA study concluding Comsec also view 8-10 coastal defense.

18 Sept: item in file

[13 Sept: US 12 intercepts] / [Did Pico know of intercepts of Comsec  
before making statement?]

10 Sept: White House: R, S, MoA, Center, Comsec (Aug?)

21 Dec 30 Aug, U-2 over 2nd day, 2nd day, 2nd day, 2nd day,

big day. 4/8 Sept: view of flight, Comsec, Comsec, Comsec,

Comsec, reduction to view of operation 2 Sept.

✓



5) The normal ASCOM was disconnected (see 6 msg).

Hand intell. - short lines - not used as to produce

a sense of alarm is a feeling that urgent action required.

Details of 54-20 and other advanced defense system

(see 20, see 21-22) had been pre-arranged in N.T. of Aug 1

and this prob. remained fully reported. Hence, examine

came out as a short, but as a problem to be dealt

with deliberately (May even have arranged to allow some

of urgency of 23 Aug, known later being than unknown).

[ Crisis of 23 Aug - 5 2:15 over ]

Planned to provide coastal coverage of east of Cuba,

for full story. No immediate need for re-coverage of

area of 2 previous missions

of finally, struck down: Admiral claiming imminent invasion;

low force in Berlin, after election

[ 6 2:15: Admiral over, Admiral over ] [ Admiral over ]

Also would not damage Cuba as containing issue.

[ Admiral over of incident ]

✓

R applied to Tax (7) standard credit of 14.  
covering remainder of island.

~~all 6 have same value~~

(As with the record of disbursements not to multiply known items,  
but in obtaining approval for tracks & it was necessary (?)  
to include accounts they didn't).

Less spread (cutting) ? 1st flight in relation to  
was coming of new 2 1st quarter - 10 1-2

Area with original length	2 segments
---------------------------	------------

SW 1/4 35-2-42 The diamond, a very disjunctive in structure,  
judged a degree of rock & usually it is soft, green  
in color. [?] [?]

but failed to give adequate weight to force of law, etc.  
and to great body of reasoning by Law / Principle.

Eigenes ist die Selbstbestimmung der Individuen - Freiheit.

under investigation - maybe push to find out what  
essentially makes <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>attract</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>a</sup> ~~series~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>visiting</sup>



but I can think in terms of slow-paced progress  
for USA, Brazil, Indonesia, under Cuban pattern means  
already <sup>completely</sup> different.

Also, Indonesian program looks pattern in request,  
under low program to supply gear needed by Indonesians,  
delivery of gear concentrated into their training, changed  
to accelerate delivery & provide low manpower (C rules  
mandated by laws - conduct patrols under normal pattern.  
mandated since though political gain not intended;  
risk of war not Antar.

Re Indonesia PAVE inhibited later discussion; not critical  
as request & against continued amplification; was list it  
what C was doing

✓



DCI

7 Sept: with Carter again frequent report coming;

my hand is in the night pass. <sup>presently</sup> short-range

some of portable type [50-100?] which could cover

important targets in SE US - base. Caribbea

[Q. I imagine 50-4 is portable, possible?] 2

10 Sept: "Pittsburgh for me to relationship extensive with

(13, 16, 20) defenses being established in Cuba... appear to

views formed  
to DDI/ENE (SG? Pres?). no quite possible measures now taken

are for portable covering security of some

offensive capability used as MSRM to be

installed by base after present phase completed

and extra released <sup>from</sup> by intelligence - suggest

PWT study notices...

14 Sept: Do not wish to be overly alarming the matter

but believe CLE & some must keep them informed

of danger of a surprise and also that intention of

make those possibly beyond our capability INDICATING

✓

once Cuba defense system operative."

[ONE, etc. in effect among 50 prospects on basis  
of US reliability; & based on US will, which  
M.C. & K. knew were shorts than estimates.]

20 Sept: observation on WISE. Was an alternative to can all

that an offensive base in Cuba will provide  
base with most important & effective landing position  
in connection with all other critical areas and bases  
they might take understand rights to establish beach  
position."

As a result of O's presence, chairman, examination  
of other methods of action (OO) had called on 27 Aug;  
called on 7 Sept, Bush had asked about bases on 7 Sept 1960

Note: The indication was in form of what might  
be necessary after the establishment of a complete  
SA-2 defense, had made use of O-2 operations, with the



[ SNIE. White House ]

"Why are they 'hush-hush' before the election?"

Will the position be better then? (Not asked.)

Wants an answer for shipping business? (Yes?)

Just to be sure? So get better known?

[ Effect of Duty-Free ] to reduce incidence

to such incidents, and to add to cost of

incidents? (Also there feeling that incidents incident

there would be an incident with incidents in US

response there would be incident in incident?

What was our plan in case of incident?

What was our expectation of US response?

|| | What of Sept 5 a day of flight had been

|| | shot down?

|| | What would we have done? Expected?

|| | What would we have done? Allying?

|| | Final action of US of NAACP?



## Elections

Do voters really understand? When has a  
conflict happened? (Berlin & blockade? Hungary?  
(Did they really choose Hungary or provide an escape  
for inattention, inaction?) (Germany? Korea? Cuba?)

Or is it fear by Poles of appearing to risk conflict,  
making crablike decisions or committing to appearing  
unity rather than involving it? e.g. the offending  
Berlin blockade; U-2 incident - committed to collaborate East in beg.

Real attitude of Poles & SG toward U-2 incident  
differs from in Feb 1956 from attitude of  
Johnson in May 1954? (In either case did  
they even imagine it? Did they know before if they  
stopped? e.g. Nation's dissemination by NSA?)

important thought that only at the point would the  
have met the introduction of such weapons as MBRMs)

[Thence: a) McC thought MBRMs would not come till

very later; did not think they were already in?

b) Was McC surprised to learn they were already in?

What other specifically surprised at the consequence?

c) Other were willing to use other means than U-2 if necessary?

d) Whether if U-2 had been shot down, a big strike?

(Might we have raised suspicion, need for surveillance;

perhaps SU willing to be more explicitly a neutral move?

What then?)

e) How likely were others - 35 personnel in situation

by SU awareness about situation?

f) Did McC, then, agree that U-2 program was adequate

for light? Did he press for coverage before 10 Oct?

118-28954



19 Sept, USIB: Center started driving to meet SF-101  
near Cuba; Trinity also could be postponed to SG

(On 12 Sept, Center moved to 1st Def: organized "necessary  
actions (including SG approval) to provide for employment,  
which directed by higher authority, of tactical-type assets  
against sites in Cuba.

19 Sept. US rep informed SG on low level of activity  
Cuba; but 1st Def (above)

Center said: "we cannot put a stop to collection in  
Cuba; otherwise the Base would move. Now when  
the points of decision have been reached."

1 (Action initiated 12 Sept from info)  
consideration of use of  
SG approved Trinity at next meeting;

27 Sept, CGM forwarded to USIB program for the use.

K mission (23 Sept - 2 Oct) programmed to meet Cuba;  
but should cover.



17 Sept. Checklist - set of low tide marks 4-22

27 Sept. Correspondence received to Havens

10 Sept. The [unclear] by Carter (Parr request).

12 Sept. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] + [unclear] [unclear].

3 Oct. The } Oct. Brief.

9 Oct. Cannon

First [unclear] equipment for [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] on [unclear], t

Married 7-8 Sept. [unclear] 15 Sept. First [unclear] [unclear] t

site 2, 17 Sept. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

detected.

Major construction at [unclear] [unclear] by 15 Sept.

Notes: several [unclear] reports of low runs, from

[unclear] to [unclear] [unclear] Aug 60 (before my low runs).

211 [unclear] reports on [unclear] to [unclear] [unclear] before

1 Jan 62. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] 15-20 [unclear] 62

In May 12, NDIC started series, Photo Evaluation of  
Life on Cuba. Between 31 May - 5 Oct (7 issues)  
NDIC examined 135 news reports referred to it for comments;  
only 3 cited misstatements. That couldn't be linked to SAM or  
Communist circles; NDIC requested those 3.

14 Aug CI ordered orally of NDIC's office [from DCI?] not  
to publish any info sent on missile bases till it had  
been checked out with NDIC. (matter of intell.

Technique, not policy)

[Interpreted as banning publication without comment?]

CI rebuked NDIC (14 Aug and 3 Oct) 25 separate reports,  
4 more by phone; in all cases NDIC either backed the  
news or made negative reply.

[Did this stop publishing?]

In Sept, 882 reports on internal security and  
defense (only the small publishable fraction of news material).



Knowledge of Analysts that deployment of SAMs  
was going on (after 24 Aug - 5 Sept) plus difficulty in  
obtaining clearance in tally of SAMs from defense records,  
skewed MREEM deployment.

[e.g. should make it harder for operator to  
justify his own feeling of conviction;  
or to communicate the credibility weight of a report.]

[Should operator/analyst be caught in false  
alarm during the process?]

However, the Communist case was targeted for action, not  
as another location where alleged missile activity ~~was~~  
~~to be~~ should be targeted by action [was this a  
category?] but as a suspect SS-C site. Process took  
2 weeks for information to target Canada. Also on 23 Sept;  
known on 21 Sept, Dec 17 Sept, received 27 Sept; looked  
at case coming. Canada on 13 Oct (COMSEC Targeting  
Working Group, Comby C14)



Priority requirements should be [highlighted] for  
loss of [unclear] inside, constitution, [unclear] attention to SS-4  
[unclear] [unclear]!

Wrote 27 Ltr, night home written item for CIB, report  
for inspection. 27 Ltr

27 Ltr [unclear] (x- [unclear] [unclear] for [unclear])

(Meanwhile, other, "technical" restriction - night home left  
restriction [unclear] (but, only in CIA?))

Restrictions should apply to Checklist, but [unclear] of this  
([unclear]?) [unclear] for [unclear] info largely on the [unclear]

Dr. [unclear] <sup>CIA</sup> to [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]; His cut off

CIA from info on [unclear] [unclear] (Restriction [unclear])

[Cut off Para?]

by [unclear] volume of [unclear] material on [unclear]

Within Checklist group, or any other CIA officers,  
know that possibility of [unclear] base had been [unclear] by [unclear]  
and [unclear] [unclear] with [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

(NSA-14 181 Report, editorial review, except in form of SR/15).

Should items have been published without review?

Analysts <sup>too</sup> sensitive to the potential political impact of the reports they were receiving; this would not have influenced them against publishing, but would have made them want to be double sure before subjecting anything back to the Main in Havana.

Also, rigid compartmentation between COMSEC-SS

org. responsible for collection and the intell. analysts.

Even if my CIA analysts on Cuban problems were not identical chances. Hence, they did not know that as

members of Pinar del Rio and San Vito were involved in left program or that their program was directly delayed. They had no way of knowing that the plate indication they had requested would not have been forthcoming, so they might well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it.



Without him, it would have appeared in Cuban Daily  
Morning, but might have come in (checklist) (probe  
into Cuban movement about process for CIB); as Oros  
might have known there was suspicious activity around  
him Cristobal about a week before he apparently died.  
He was targeted, but concern not published

Probe that SG first heard of this concern on

7 Oct.

Day of 7-10 days between analytic correlation of reports and  
SG meeting due to unknown processes of admin. structure. (?)  
conspiring SG; Machine designed to provide  
diagnostic justification and Machine taken months before  
real decision was made, / procedure dating to early days  
of U-2 ops. Intended for control of diagnostic Strategic  
action of USSR, not for tactical (military) situation. After  
10 Oct they were justified. [But, was?]

Left program that 26 days from 12 Sept (earliest  
in which 10 Sept decision could have been implemented)  
through 7 Oct. (Cloud cleared again on 17 Sept;  
26 Sept near Bona, 29th Lake of Bona - Bay of Bona;  
5 Oct further; 7 Oct further).

On 20 days with Bad. we were out of the overflows  
( $< 15\%$  cloud cover).

Effect of SG decision of 10/18 & weather events  
delay consideration (?) of what action should be taken  
until early October.

Bundy & Holman, who told (Bundy) (Holman)



By late Sept, delays in room (?) + sense of evidence  
of continued low building, had generated greatly  
increased sense of urgency in Wash. [Who?]

But high level consideration of NRCM's change in  
time of low action after SA-2's fully operational.

No doc. evidence of action toward withdrawal of SA-4-  
dependent areas till 26 (Aug) night of 4 Oct

DC: 4-2 flight was now (before last 2 Sept flts) restricted  
by presence of SAMs to SE quadrant of Cuba: questioned  
whether this was a reasonable restriction at the time,  
particularly since SAMs were almost certainly not operational.

[Did others agree on restriction?]

36 ordered NRO (present) to prepare recall program  
for warning of Cuba for night of 9 Oct

6 Oct: COMUSCIB went to NRO still front. + Rearguard.

USCIB considered this on 6 Oct.

Bundy + Helms, who told Bundy that morning,

9 Oct. SG: VR<sub>2</sub> first accumulation: 0-2 inches over  
surface. MREM as seen in weather permits.

Flight also to have been one of 2000 with  
 flight unit ready operational & this  
 secondary (?) depiction to illustrate status of 2000  
to command center & getting complete O-2 coverage as  
best as possible

WDO's of course. If there is no ~~to~~ reaction  
to the initial W-Z. matter, making coverage of  
western end of island by multiple W-Z with the same  
as soon as weather permits [Approved?]

SS recorded at head of 1st, Pass above —  
 base of (?) Boundary of low crystalline rocks at the  
 base. Minor bluffs by mouth of 1st & 2nd.

[Lithostat: accident that sets up - 3] But note.  
?   
essential base. Pres. product of synthesis.]



After the mission of previous, C/S received ~ 10 Oct  
Many photos of 28 Oct & 29-28 water (seen by U-2 ~  
17 Oct, along with others). In checklist of 11 Oct

(after 10 Oct)

10 Oct: DCI briefing of C/S Subcommittee of House Subgroup on  
building, including El-28. Commented on NRB's on  
lines of action, adding that there were many reports  
who did not believe the House would make much a  
move, but he differed with them; told SC he  
had a threat for one flight the next day - on  
11 Oct. Carter T. Saltwater 12; 40 Oct. Carter [10 Oct]

said, refugees in water but no land evidence.

12 Oct: Carter to Stevens - House Bill (before, Carter available).

13 Oct: DC. NAC told DCI <sup>possibly</sup> early morning; 20/5 - Carter.

Carter said would tell Taylor & Casady, Mark if he was present.

[36 times?] As wife became frustrated, DCI decided not to  
wait till morning to tell NAC & State; about 2200 he passed to  
Randy & Halson, who told Bush. Next morning, Carter - DCI Briefed Mark.

initial actual deployment.

Nothing on low state, preparation for deployment as base.

4 July (initial): Paul Carter heads, reading more low  
and, and I, specifically some advanced equipment  
used as MIA-215 and SCAR, initial, SI already  
providing to Submarine, Egypt is long.

18 July: C1 Paul had left, however, without named liability  
& communique, "a pretty good sign that visit was  
non-destructive."

1 Aug 67: NIE 55-2-12 Lt. Caspary in Cuba as initial  
foundation for MARSOS.

2. By force of circumstances, USA is becoming more and  
more committed to providing strength to the Castro Regime.  
USCIB, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect  
and defend the regime in all contingencies.  
By now we also believe it unlikely that Plac will station  
in Cuba. Plac, conduct visits of my description, & host for  
period of the sat.



c. The laws would almost certainly never intend  
to harass them nor capriciously but  
but have sought to waste the impression that Cuba  
was under the protection of the inside power

d. We believe that Cuba will continue to limit its  
military assistance to Cuba [to defensive weapons]  
such policy would not preclude the provision of  
more advanced jet fighters, tanks, modern weapons, or  
even a token number of F-4's

I. Prohibition arising of "almost certainly"  
believe  
and not preclude

1 Aug 2004? internal paper to West some if not all  
ships probably are carrying military goods to Cuba.

(vs. 1994 count on same info - its construction report  
of Royal Gull to Cuba that Royal had ordered 21 to  
take back weapons was mentioned.)

(DIA thought increased shipping due to Trade, till 22 Aug?)

4 Aug: CL: Jim - suspect some, 1 ship

7 Aug: info received that ship to Cuba, initial info.

8 Aug: 2001 Original Public Policy Comm, including removal of  
the military equip. is that same.

10 Aug: 140432005 entry: 1001.

12 Aug: CL: prob 3446

3 Aug, 25 Aug



10 July Taylor, because of extensive use of room in  
following Chicom and set in Tulim, and set DCI  
for comp. review of room

16 July: DDC recommended to DCI that V-2 flights over  
Cuba be continued at the current 2/100 level.  
In justification, review mission brief provided  
"Conclusive evidence that remaining reports of subs  
is similar to those in Cuba case before," and  
"most important evidence for my evidence of  
subsequent of SA-2 mission only for M-6-10 is Cuba."  
Approved by SG on 19 July, the Pres.

21 Aug McC, R, H, J, DCP, J, J, McC

22 Aug NSC/181 analysis of probe into probe, "probe"  
reports of evidence of other SA-2 mission of  
weekly US

21 Aug: DCI total growth up available since 10 Aug

inhibited extent of low growth than previously

Height, but inhibited SAMs; revised loss of

MSDM:



## Surprise

### Recipe for Total Surprise Despite Warning —

Inevitable After the Event

- A. Strong belief <sup>and desire</sup> that danger, if any, will not come before a certain date; all evidence & warning consistent with this
- B. Strong incentives not to prepare for it, plan, or prevent, sooner than necessary (ie before a certain date — e.g. Election — or until preparation — Pearl Harbor — or unless necessary) to avoid forming public opinion, <sup>(forming 'expectation' or 'anticipation' —</sup> ~~creating expectation~~ <sup>involvement</sup>
- C. Limitations on action, passive posture, to avoid providing danger sooner, or at all, or to provide grounds for saying to <sup>or internal critics</sup> strong provocations
- D. Restrictions on dissemination of info — relating to future threat — subject to interpretation as understating current threats (in which you don't believe, and don't want to act against 1. <sup>Pearl Harbor</sup> <sup>Surprise</sup> <sup>cue</sup>
- Pearl Harbor Variant: Not Belief that threat is to different place; strong wish not to prepare for possibility that attack will be (when it comes).

<sup>much</sup>  
Thus, evidence is thoroughly consistent with  
Threats A and B. (Attack now or attack later;  
attack later, <sup>only before, not, later</sup> no attack; attack here, attack there;  
attack this way, or that.)

I believe strongly because of presumption, <sup>or</sup> special, private  
evidence, that B is much more likely than A. In fact,  
A is highly unlikely. But I do not wish to reveal that  
there is new evidence <sup>at 21</sup> supporting A:

1) I do not wish to reveal source of info.

or 2) I can't reveal crucial parts of evidence discrediting A  
part of an allies

or 3) public has different presumptions, prior beliefs;

new evidence would lead them to demand action.

4) Govt of public or Allies should interpret evidence differently...

5) " " " " have different goals/values; if

their attention even focussed on A as possibility, would demand action  
of action perhaps...

6) There are costs, constraints, risks that can't be revealed to

public, or public would make the differently, or public is ignorant of,  
possibility of action, or effectiveness, less than public knows or can be told.

7) In particular, revealing even limited information of A to enemy or

Allies might trigger undesirable reactions.

or the press, etc. as "too costly" for other reasons besides revealing to them.  
(p. 17.)



Moreover: i) I don't think need to prepare for A is  
urgent, though perhaps (except for communication  
aspect) desirable (e.g. if it could be done  
secretly: no leaks, no signs, to public, allies, enemy, etc.)

ii) I can prepare for B, covertly without  
preparing for A, or even while unpreparing for A  
(increasing vulnerability, raising costs if A does occur,  
neglecting A, preparing A will not occur, <sup>Cuba</sup> threatening increasingly  
costly acts if A should occur, "doing nothing to detonate" B.

[Cuba: desires to reassess values that Admin agreed on  
crisis-mgmt of A, would act if A, while emphasizing that no  
immediate facts of A: predictions + threats, "warnings" (public  
warnings ignored by SO. — Sup.)] defensive

BOR: iii) I <sup>think I</sup> can preemptively prepare for B with small risk;  
or, right about now will not prepare for B, it would cost. (From)

Hence: I refrain from preparing for A etc all if I even  
disapprove. I even refrain from preparing for B.

Then A occurs. So, B occurs, and assumption  
icc (i) + icc (ii)  
if ~~ic~~ icc above then not wrong.

Trouble explaining why no preparation, apparently about  
no expectation of A, when there was evidence pointing to A.

Exp. when Premise A is weak, or seems unreasonable, or  
evidence for it can't be revealed;

and/or Premise B can't be explained.

So, total failure to prepare for A seems  
inevitable: either negligent, or deliberately malicious.

(i.e. nature not to prepare for something that is expected, and is  
expected to be costly for nature: for individual or otherwise gain).

(Truth: it is regarded as low prob, but desire not  
to prepare for it at all, or to focus public <sup>or my</sup> attention on it,  
or to support belief by public or others that it has very  
the moderately low prob that seems valid.)



Meanwhile, there is already a description of public  
or allies that there is any evidence supporting A

(Admin. regards it as invalid, or less strong than it will

be to others, or contradicted by other evidence, <sup>(prior/prior)</sup>

or as "story for A vs. C, but really generated by and  
pointing to B.")

Little or dissemination. etc.

Special case:

You half-expect B, but you want it to come as a  
surprise: to allies, public, Congress, etc. or as  
apparent surprise to you.

In arranging this surprise, A seems as a real  
considerable, not that obviously.

surprise to you — and finds you totally unprepared, for  
reasons hard to explain — connected with efforts to ensure that  
B will come, if at all, as surprise.

[B might be our action: a desired fruit accomplished.]

To achieve fruit accomplished: 1) encourage chosen states of mind

2) don't encourage counter-propaganda, predictions; 3) don't want an  
opponent's ability to keep memory of A secret.

Persons Why <sup>a)</sup> Negative Evidence Regarded as Strong  
and <sup>b)</sup> Positive as weak

2) I thought more lead time required, not only for  
IREM (there were discussed "in time") but  
for SS-4 (did McC expect SS-4 in "field work"  
- SS-1-3?)

2) Excess. confidence in SI?

3) Long use of private "channel" with substantial to safeguard  
of decisions; esp. given with questions, following political committee

4) SO failure to use info to others, much as evidence?

5) SO should have "looked up?"

6) Long history of false reports; present more of false reports.

7) Political bias of refugees to exaggerate SS involvement, threat

8) Interpersonal differences; question of Rigg

4) Personal pressure of SP-4 to compound decisions

[Understand? Possible indication of SP-4 & HR-12]

5) Reports uncorroborated by other analysts; didn't know one coverage?

6) Did analysts know of left SS letter?



6) 7) concern for security situation; & H.C.

3 (1) (Ch. 1) - budgetary needs towards the program  
didn't know the cost being incurred. <sup>wanted to feel</sup> thought it was

Admin was pretty strongly into that A - MRPMs

Before action - wouldn't occur; was not reporting

degree of concern (e.g. SC, situation, figure, figure, picture)

in that B - inside the situation - i.e. after 5-11:

operational (into spread & exp of program, its personnel,  
advantages

Just like Jerry.

1) What were we doing to detect B?

2) In retrospect, would it have been enough? Or would our  
reception of prior news have been misleading (W.C.)?

3) What would we have done if SC had occurred  
after this to stop over 100m

4) quietly but without detection would we notice?

This brings up: WHAT IS A LEGAL FORCE FOR?

Prud'homme - <sup>(US)</sup> - Cuba - <sup>US</sup> - Synchro -

No insurance against threat is known as is not  
to seem congrate concern with Threats & unlike delicate  
us insure was

(Black cap that A - and then threat - unlike concern,  
and that insurance against B - mid - then - on the  
rought later will be undesirable to be any more - )

This was the Minister - Cap Pattern

Was a Prud'homme possible - if CU had not noted it.

More relevant: WAS A CUBA POSSIBLE?

(If only PRB had been informed, Cuba important look  
had from point of view of unlike action - )

even program adequate relation to mid - then and.

flow of info from US and then process into adequate.

In IL-78, PRB - not was straight to be the PRB in

had the more and congrate it.





(1 from P. 2000)

Sunday: 11am P. 11th. In 11. Tent 5: H

Exp. Can. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11.

5:45 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th.

6:30 P. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th. 11th.

U. T. Miller Center.





1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Thurs Oct 25

Enter 17.5

Ready to U that at 2:19 Kaddy EOT

2:20 U that second message - mist direct report.

S.C. 1st Challenge Given

11:50 State message 212 In message turned back

at 8 am Day interrupted broadcast

Fri Oct 26 Ex C 10 am 10 pm

7:50 am Message broadcast

6 pm letter from K

Letter from K to U that - staying away from you

Reported message from SO.

4 pm 4 pm

Sat 27 Oct Ex C 10 am K letter in Radio Museum 7:00

Enter 10:5-11 am U2 shot down In message U2

over SO 4:35: W4 from Moscow "unidentified"

Collecting frequently messages + info 3:35 message U2 shot

Ex C at 4 pm. Letter from Moscow to K. Transmitted

Oct 23 Ep Com 12-6 <sup>Thurs evening</sup> Pres. <sup>Pres. of A. J. 19</sup>

K letter received 11:56 am

Pres. reply sent 6:51 pm

7:50 O. speaks to OAS Reg. of Council

2:00 OAS resumes

4:45 17-0 notes, with Resolution looking Over the

Emergency Committee removed.

4 pm letter to S.C.

Oct

Oct 24 Ep Com 10 O. notes taken up at

9. S.C.

2. U.S. last message to P. and L.

7:24 pm K letter to P.

<sup>Friday 24</sup>  
1:59 pm Pres. reply to, <sup>head received + low level</sup>

(Overland)

(U.S. to 2d letter)



[Power force can be used to

- a) achieve national objectives internal & external
- b) unite national forces
- c) ensure personal / political longevity for
- d) ensure personal unity to: Prin, Unification, Democracy

Unification to use national power for

(C) or (d) [Cuba] could lead apparently to  
United States leaders would be willing to use it for  
(a) or (b) — even though "justified" for a-b, "unjustified"  
for (C) - d.

Low power, + MPPM = Cuba cannot interfere

P, H, F in US, and create political legends for  
Prin & Admin. Prin has no "rights" to interfere

possibly, or even to reject, yet if he accepts this,  
it will not only interfere with his prestige & status, and  
lead to death; but both allies & enemies will believe

he will never use power (and, without  
unanimous institution will support). But Prin

26 Oct.

33. August 11

Standing Reserve.



Under the SG hall of 1st court for, also handled  
under different, was formed (?) against a Committee of  
Under Secretary of State (Chambers), e.g. Hester; D. P. D. of  
DCI, C. C. C.; Spec. Sect. (Kendall) was representative of  
WH). In Under Sec. Philby (Chambers). Under Secretary  
had special staff under Spec. Sect. Persons would  
come over from CIA. In "installed" what's better would  
never attend meetings. 1956 had staff working on  
again not on for.

Boiler, 56 in.	Inspected on the Day of Pipe.
Water, 4 FR McGowan Lamin.	

After Bay of Pigs, I got 2nd part under 1942;  
6/18/46 hunt at home to 500000 minutes.

Q. 10 didn't want to play because he had to go to school.  
 Taylor finished for a while then he left.

Is also sent both morning & evening, when 1000 (Ref'd)  
for consideration & settling. (See 1000, Standard, 1903)

Pr. notes

W. 9. + 17. at meeting at State

Frank

Ball: like U-2 incident: mistake or misinterpretation?

session

Thompson. Could be hanging from today. (?)

Went West



It is a well-known fact that, when it comes to a trial of  
State and the reputation of business and credit, the  
public opinion is very sensitive to the business and credit of the  
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1) I have often to the necessity of making  
thousands of commitments which he would then have to carry  
out — and I have often been increasing the  
costs of business and increasing the time (I have  
think of this as favor to him — not, little time, however in  
business. But if — because he doesn't know — he  
makes predictions, statements of trust, or even, threats  
or commitments, not to take care or become your slave  
(I can well be certain) forced him to do so, but because  
he thinks he can cheaply do so, for domestic gain, with  
small risk — then he has increased the costs to  
him of every move.

I have don't force to make maximum political effort  
to others, to avoid inevitable political loss (in case  
of your challenge or victory, <sup>in case</sup> never more) I thought for  
the 10th of 11.

2nd Day

Sept 6 1844 - Sun

Sept 7. City - Mon

Remains

Sept 8. City - Tue

Steady

Sun 11th May 1845



Bill Stewart

Col. CMC

Col. Fred Parker (USAF) (Comm AFIC)  
(Adman)

Col. Howard Parker (Army; Adman, Bureau)

77th Clothing, All Army, AF Lt. Admin Off

(As Attache: Hungary, Hungary)

(As Attache: Hungary, Hungary)

Col. George Rogers

John E. Patton: AFNNA

XNT

Dave Wright to IOA (Was of CI & JSEF)

(Was USAF)

F. W. M. (U.S.) Parker, (Was Head of CI in 1944)



SOU SIDE

A. What was SO SNIF below Caber, 1/12?

What evidence could be seen?

B. What got her out so fast, without further digging?

C. What if he had dug on 29-45 pas? (with no shovelwork?)

Then he appeared, not long, what was his fate?

By accident, when he started to move, and did not?

Was he before he was hit?

D. What was R's probable reaction, & given state; influence

E. What did R probably learn from crisis?



359

1. Why did Mr. G. give idea of importance for Christ?!

Why did Mr. G. ? Did Mr. G. tell Guss?

How could he know Guss is a Chartist?

Why number of 26 bonds before 9 Oct?

2. How, knowledge of 26 changed since 14 Oct 22?

3. Timeline of Guss M. G. to Guss until Aug 1 and till

later 2.11 to Oct 15, Oct 15-22, 22-4th

Influence on Guss? by description of Guss?

Ques 6 10 21 22 30-2.11-22 2.11-22

4. Purpose of restriction of 15 Oct, 11 Oct?

5. Question to Guss, interpretation?

6. Why did 26 bond till (as referred to Guss Guss)

Did Mr. G. know Guss is a Chartist?

Did Mr. G. know Guss is a Chartist? Mr. G.?

(Did Mr. G. know Guss is a Chartist?)

7. Why would Guss have been restricted? MRG's low trusts Guss?